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The plaintiffs take exception to a number of assertions
by defendantf both in its Statement of Facts section and later in
the Argument when referring to the facts; first, because as often
as not counsel for the defendant cites no point in the Record from
which the alleged facts are being stated; and second, because they
are either incomplete or misstate the facts.

One flagrant example

is at Page 6 of defendant's Brief where it is stated:
"Royalty payments have been made to plaintiffs and other
mineral owners in Section 25 resulting from the well
drilled on plaintiffs1 property, as well as from a well
drilled on adjacent lands."
No reference is made to the record, and defendant
neglects to add that, notwithstanding some oil was pumped and
considerable natural gas continued to flow, no royalty payments
have been received by the plaintiffs from March 1986 to the time
of trial as indicated in the Record, pages 202 and 203, and as
demonstrated by Exhibits 4 and 5.
That same Exhibit 5 shows considerable oil production in
the year prior to 1986 and very little production (only a few
barrels a month) thereafter.

That exhibit emphasizes the court's

finding that defendant's presence on the property is entirely in
its control and refutes assertions by defendant in its Brief at
pages 6 and 7 that "Defendant's use of the property is not
perpetual" and "Ed Whicker testified that in his opinion the well
would be plugged and the ground restored to its original condition
in 1996."
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cannot sell or transfer the same and will eventually
return complete ownership to plaintiffs."
Plaintiffs have also treated the matter of the prospects
for return of the property, but counsel for defendant is simply
misstating the law in claiming that Linmar Energy cannot sell or
transfer its interest in that easement.

It is to be noted that

Linmar was not the original lessee on this property.

Linmar

acquired it from Walter Duncan (Ex. 17) and therefore came into
its interest after the fact and is at full liberty to assign that
lease, together with the easement to whomever it chooses, and
there is simply no indication by way of evidence or law in the
record to suggest anything to the contrary.

If counsel for

defense means that defendant cannot build a house on its easement,
that brings us to the following group of questions and answers by
defense counsel of Mr. Palmer:
"Q You think it's fair for an oil company who does not obtain
the rights of the fee title owner to have to pay a fee title
interest value?
"A There are two ways you need to look at that.
interested—well can I make an example?
"Q

If you was

Sure.

"A If you was interested in a piece of property that I owned,
but my mother, who was 73 had a life estate in it, I can sell
you that property. Would you pay more for that property than
an adjoining piece of property that my son who is 25 years old,
had a life estate in? Linmar has the property tied up for an
indefinite period of time. They can keep it for six months.
They can keep it for 20 years or forever. The landowner
doesn't have any say about it. And yes I do think that is
taking the property owner's rights away." (R. 572-73)
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evidence in this case indicates that the well site should have
been placed on other property.

Nevertheless the thrust of

plaintiffs1 argument in Point I of their Brief was that there were
reasonable alternatives on the Smith property.

Defendant failed

to meaningfully address those arguments, and plaintiffs
respectfully submit that they thereby concede the point.
The defendant is in error about the facts in asserting
on page 7:
"Mr. Smith's only position was that he did not want
the well or road anywhere on his property and refused to
discuss options involving his property."
The testimony on those discussions appears in the body
of plaintiffs' original Brief (see page 22 thereof) and makes it
abundantly clear that several "options involving his property,"
to-wit, access from at least two other sources to the proposed
well site were discussed at length and that it was the defendant
who refused to budge, not Mr. Smith.

Also in that summary in

plaintiffs' Brief the dispute over whether or not Mr. Whicker
proposed any alternative, to-wit, access along the east border or
down the middle of the property was sharply disputed, Smith
asserting no such option was provided, and Whicker insisting that,
while he "had no record" that any such option was offered by him
at the time of the conversations, he would have made such an offer
if he had been asked. (R. 231-2)
At page 4 of defendant's Brief it is asserted that the
well was placed in the southwest corner of the property for

"geological and economic factors."
upon any technical data.

Those "factors" are not based

There is no showing that another

location on the property would not have been equally as good
geologically and economically.

The geological and ecomonical

factors are nothing more than a "rule of thumb" of sorts that
defendant wanted to locate the well as near as possible to where
another well was already located.

Certainly, under Flying Diamond

defendant does not have the right to place its well anywhere it
wants just to save a dollar if the result is unreasonably
destructive to the landowner.

It is a matter of balancing

interests, and the general notion of locating near where another
well is located, without any other data, ought to yield to the
substantial and known needs of the landowner.
As to the matter of whether any other options were
afforded to plaintiffs, we desire to point out that Mr. Whicker
had no "recollection" of having been asked to locate the road
elsewhere.

As to the well itself, he stated at R. 192 (Tr. 27):

"Q And that's your only reason, so you didn't give him any
options to try to suggest you put it some other place, you
wanted that southwest corner — period paragraph, on this
Smith property, right?
"A We wanted to put the well as far to the southwest as we
very possibly could.
"Q

So the answer to my question is —

"A Yes."
The testimony is contradictory as to whether defendant
ever asked plaintiffs where they wanted the road.

Plaintiffs

assert that defendant did not so ask (R. 627-28), and defendant
claims it did (R. 191-193).

There is no dispute, however, that

defendant never gave plaintiffs any option as to the actual site
of the well. (R. 192)
POINT III.

THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE OF THE TRACT IN

QUESTION IS FOR SUBDIVISION PURPOSES AS TESTIFIED BY APPRAISER
PALMER, WHOSE TESTIMONEY WAS NOT IMPEACHED.
In its Point II.A. defendant argues that Richard
Palmer's testimony regarding the highest and best use as being
subdivision is impeached.
At pages 17 and 18 of defendant's Brief, under the
heading "Bias," defendant states:
"Mr. Palmer was aware of Howard Carroll's $2,000
per acre valuation and that said price was not high
enough for plaintiffs' purposes."
That language implies that Mr. Palmer testified that the entire
tract was evaluated by him at $4,200 per acre.
the fact.

That is simply not

The $4,200-per acre figure related to the 4.76 acres

taken, and as noted in plaintiffs' Brief at' page 33, the "before"
value for the entire parcel, as testified to by Mr. Palmer, was
$2,500 per acre. (R. 369)
Defendant then attempts at pages 18 through 21 of its
Brief to impeach the testimony of Richard Palmer.
With regard to the highest and best use, defendant
claims that Mr. Palmer's opinion "is in complete disregard" of:

"(i) the fact that property had always been used for
agricultural purposes," (Emphasis added.)
Palmer acknowledged such agricultural use and, as
pointed out at some length in plaintiffs1 Brief, because of the
other considerations, such as the proximity to Altamont City, the
demand for residential lots, the development and sale of
residential subdivisions in the area, the proximity of utilities
either on the property or immediately adjacent thereto, were the
basis for his opinion.

This court has repeatedly held that the

actual present use need not be for appraisal purposes the highest
and best use.
See, for example State v. Jacobs, 16 Ut 2d 167, 397 P2d
463 (1964), at page 169, where this court observed on September
20, 1962,
" . . . the State commenced this action by service
of summons upon the defendants. At that time the
property was zoned by Washington County for agricultural
and grazing purposes."
then, after tracing the chain of title and the defendants1
ultimate acquisition of the property, the court continued:
"Defendants1 claim that the lower court committed error
in that it (1) instructed the jury that the price paid
for the tract was immaterial; (2) excluded evidence
relating to the proposed development of the property;
and (3) excluded evidence regarding the probability of a
zoning change."
Although rejecting the defendants1 claims, the court
nonetheless indicated the ruling law at page 170 as follows:
"The owner of property under condemnation is
entitled to a value based upon the highest and best use

to which it could be put at the time of the taking,
without limitation as to the use then actually made of
it. However, the projected use, affecting value, must
not only be possible, but reasonably probably. It must
not be merely in the realm of speculation because the
land is adaptable to a particular use in the remote and
uncertain future." (Emphasis added.)
The Jacobs case was later quoted by the Supreme Court in
a case remarkably similar to this case.

In State of Utah by and

through its Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P2d 872
(1969), the State took 7.23 acres of vacant land located in Cedar
City which at the time had been zoned by Cedar City as light
industrial in anticipation of the State's condemnation.

The court

described the facts as follows at page 318:
"In 1956 [twelve years before the condemnation] the
defendant's tract of land had been made part of a
proposed residential subdivision called Northwood. The
development had not further materialized. In December
of 1961, it had been rezoned light industrial. The
evidence indicates, and the trial court accepted the
view, that this was done in anticipation of the
construction of a new Interstate 1-15 freeway, and the
prospect of its connecting with Highway U-56 leading
west from Cedar City."
The trial court had admitted evidence as to the highest
and best use for the subject property as being residential
subdivision, to which the State objected, and the Supreme Court
ruled at page 319:
"If the damages are to be appraised on the basis of
the 'actual value at that date,' that is, the time of the
service of summons, which is deemed to be the time the
property is taken, consideration must be given to all
factors bearing upon such value that a prudent and willing
buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take
into account, including any potentional development which
could with reasonable certainty be expected with respect to

the property. This court has but recently in the case of
State by and through Road Commission v. Jacobs, by Justice
Callister, affirmed that the owner is entitled to the
valuation of his property at the time it is taken on the
basis of, its highest and best use and that this is 'without
limitation as to the use then actually made of it,'"
(Emphasis added.)
"(ii)

Duchesne County had a moratorium for subdivision

development at the time [of the taking]."
Mr. Palmer was well aware of that moratorium,
investigated it, discovered the likelihood of annexation to
Altamont City (which would have taken the property out of any
moratorium), and further opined that had a subdivider presented
a plat to the county, the county would have entertained such a
subdivision possibility in spite of the moratorium.

Moreover,

defendant's own witness, Jerry D. Allred, a member of the Duchsne
County Subdivision Ordinance Revision Committee, (R. 738)
testified that the moratorium expired in any event at least by
November 18, 1983, (R. 73 9) or two and a half months at the most
after the date in question.
(iii)

that annexation is only permissible with

"completely adjacent parcels" and opines that annexation "probably
would not have occurred" because the Smith parcel was "adjacent to
Altamont on only one corner."
The reference then to the record reveals testimony only
about the corner touching, not to the earlier statements which are
speculations of counsel not supported by any facts in evidence.
On the contrary, defendant's own witness, Mr. Allred, who was a

licensed surveyor, was asked by defense counsel what experience he
had had with regard to annexing a property to city, and the
witness indicated he had done work in Duchesne City, Tabiona and
Roosevelt, (R. 740) and then was asked by defense counsel what
problems would be posed by annexing the Smith parcel to Altamont.
Plaintiffs objected since his experience did not include
annexation for Altamonty City, and the objection was sustained.
Then he was asked about annexing to cities generally, and the
court permitted his testimony to the effect that touching a city
at one point would not justify annexation. (R. 743)
On cross-examination, however, he was asked to examine
Exhibit 22, which was a county map that includes Altamont City,
acknowledged that the Smith property's south border abuts the
school property which, while it belongs to a separate political
subdivision called a school district, was part and parcel of
Altamont City, subject to the same services, utilities
connections, etc., as the rest of city property, and that the
utility parcel in the southwest corner of Section 25 was also
within the city limits and west of the school property.

Reference

to the exhibit itself shows that Altamont City continues to extend
west of the school parcel on the south side of the main highway.
Allred was unwilling, however, to admit that a common boundary
with the school district property would satisfy the city's need
for annexation, as follows:

"Q
And in regards to that can you familiarize yourself,
looking at Exhibit No. 1, to show us what point at Exhibit 22
this point of touching you allude to is on Exhibit 22?
"A

Right here (indicating).

"Q Would you make a circle around that with the pen please.
"A

(witness complies.)

"Q Now the property immediately west from that point you
have just identified in the upper right hand corner of the
northernmost portion of Altamont City limits all of the
property to the west belongs to the Duchesne County School
District, does it not?
"A

Yes, all of that that is not being used by county roads.

"Q But there is also some property utilized in the southwest
corner of that by whom?
"A

By the Uinta Basin Telephone Company.

"Q

Telephone company?

"A

I believe.

"Q It services telephones in Altamont and surrounding areas as
far as you know?
"A

I have no idea what it does.

"Q And the city continues west to that west corner of the
school board property on the main highway, isn't that correct?
"A

Down the center of the highway, yes.

"Q All right, and in fact generally speaking the school
district property, even if it is a city school district
property, because it is tax exempt property isn't considered
part of a city, is it?
"A

No I do not believe that.

"Q

Is it taxed?

"A

I assume that it isn't.

"Q It is not? And is it submitted or is it connected to the
city utilities, generally speaking?

"A

I assume that it is.

"Q

And gets the city services?

"A

Probably does, (R. 745-48)
He was also asked on cross-examination the following:

"Q You are also aware, aren't you, there are cities that have
parcels of land that are part of the city property that don't
touch prior existing city limits and are islands or irregular
intrusions and all kinds of variations in cities all over the
state? Aren't you aware of that?
"A

I am aware that cities zone other parcels.

"Q You are also aware that the city limit lines sometimes have
islands, sometimes have intruding peninsulas or extruding
peninsulas and all other kinds of configurations, isn't that
so?
"A

I would need to know more about all other kinds.

"Q

Well yes, but a wide variety, will you go that far?

"A

I would say that, yes."

(R. 744-45)

Reference to Exhibit 22 shows that north of the Smith
parcel, well outside the Altamont City line, is a small island
that is Altamont City on which its water tanks are placed.
The final exchange with Mr. Allred brought out these
significant facts:
"Q Moreover, even if someone were to apply to the zoning
commission and be turned down, the ultimate determiner as to
whether a subdivision is or is not approved in the county is
the county commission; isn't that correct?
"A

Theirs is the final signature.

"Q And in regard to a city, even if there were a city planning
commission, the ultimate arbitror in that situation would be
the mayor and city council; is that correct?
"A

That's correct." (R. 750)

Contrast that with the language of Richard Palmer as
follows:
"Q So how did you come to conclude the highest and best use at
that time was subdivision, if there was a moratorium in the
county?
"A

In visiting with the mayor.

"Q

Of Altamont?

"A Yes, Tidwell. At that time the town would have been very
receptive to have added that 20 acre parcel to that city or
town." (R. 350)
"(iv)

There was no demand for subdivision lots in

August, 1983," says defendant, and Palmer was unaware of "how many
subdivisions" there were at that time in Altamont, "the number of
lots for sale" in a particular subdivision "or how much property
was available" and further contends that he was unaware of the
"drop in building activity," as reflected in the building permits
for the whole county in the years 1982 and 1983.
The testimony is as follows:
"Q
I'm talking about the issue of demand for residential lots
in the area of the Smith parcel, and you have indicated in your
opinion that there is a demand. We have established you
haven't checked the building department records, and I'm
telling you that assuming the building department reflected
that in 1982 there was 123 permits for single family homes and
100 permits for mobile homes, and in '83 that figure reduced
more than half to 59 homes and down from 178 mobile homes to
83, would that effect your opinion regarding trends and demands
for lots in the Smith area?
"Mr. Madsen: One final qualification. Are those figures
pretending to be for the Smith area or the whole county?

"Mr. Christiansen:
"Mr. Madsen:

Duchesne County.

The whole county?

"Mr. Christiansen: Yes.
"Mr. Madsen: But we are talking about the whole county and its
reflection on this particular one piece?
"Mr. Christiansen: Yes.
"The Witness: It would still indicate to me there is a demand
for single family homesites." (R. 547-48)
That admission of a demand for property in the Altamont
area is futher buttressed by the testimony of Mr. Curtis, the only
witness who, acting as a broker and appraiser, made his appraisal
at the time, summer of 1983, in the following exchange:
"Q Did you have the same view on a four-acre basis as to the
highest and best use being agriculture, as the 20-acre piece?
"A Probably not. On a four-acre piece a person would be able,
even without a subdivision, a person would be able to go in and
use that property if that four acres had been available. They
could use that property for an individual home site or a ranch
site or for a mobile home, as well as for pasture land.
"Q

For a horse or some other domestic animal?

"A Yes.
"Q

Was there a demand for that kind of property at that time?

"A Yes.
"Q Considerable, minor, moderate?
it?

How would you characterize

"A In the Altamont area the demand was quite high, mainly
because of the availability of the properties was so low. In
other areas people were willing to subdivide if they could, or
if they had already established. But it was not easy to find
property like this in Altamont." (R. 323-24) (Emphasis added.)

(v)

Defendant claims that "Palmer had not done any

calculations" with regard to utilities, roads, telephone lines,
etc.
That testimony is already summarized in plaintiffs1
Brief, and to repeat, Palmer did not figure in the cost of the
utilities because he was not valuing it as a completed
subdivision, but simply as land available for subdivision and
testified how near at hand each of the various utilities was. In
addition, Palmer testified that the City of Altamont supplied some
of the utilities on the Thacker Subdivision installed a few years
prior to the relevant date in question and that a reasoanble buyer
could expect to get assistance from Altamont City in the
construction of utilities.
Again, that hardly constitutes a "complete disregard" of
the competent issues.
(vi) Finally, defendant's attorneys baldly assert,
without any reference

to the record, but simply expressing their

own opinion, that Mr. Palmer could not have possibly considered
the highest and best use being residential as being "reasonable
and probable," and flatly assert a "subdivision on plaintiffs'
property was neither reasonable nor probable."
Plaintiffs have already treated that matter at length
in their original Brief at pages 23 to 30.
There are some remaining mischaracterizations of the
facts by defendant such as its assertion at page 21 of its Brief

that Palmer's "experience in Duchesne County was limited to
possibly one appraisal per year."

The testimony in that

connection is as follows:
"Q How many appraisals have you actually done in Duchesne
County during the time you've been an appraiser?
"A

Just a guess would be 15 or 20.

"Q And how many did you do for appraisals during the year
1983?
"A I don't know for sure if I done any,
doing one in either '82 or '83.

I testified I was

"Q So at that time maybe one a year in Duchesne County?
that a fair statement?

Is

"A During any one particular year such as '82 that could be
correct. Previous years there would have been more than that
done in any one particular year." (R. 528-29) (Emphasis added.)
Defendant alleges that Palmer improperly included
the Indian water right to which Linmar Energy had no title or
interest.

That matter was discussed at some length, and these

are the final questions and answers:
"Q (by Mr. Christiansen)
I'm talking about simply an
arm'slength transaction involving a willing buyer and a willing
seller. Isn't it true that the property would be more valuable
with the full Indian water right than without it?
"A If the willing buyer wanted to utilize the 20 acres in a
way that the water would be of no use to him, he wouldn't care
about it. If the willing buyer wanted to use the property as
agricultural property, the water right has a use.
"Q As an appraiser you would value the property higher with
the water right, would you not?
"A Again it would depend on what use. I valued it as a
subdivision. (Emphasis added.) (R. 584)
Defendant cites O'Conner v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co.,

63 Fed 2d 523 (8th Circuit 1933), in support of its proposition
that plaintiffs are not entitled to the value of the highest and
best use of the land taken.

The O'Conner case is simply not

applicable in Utah in the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust.
Likewise, Fulkerson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co.,
75 S.W. 2d 844 (Missouri, 1939), cited by the defendant is
inapplicable in the light of Flying Diamond v. Rust.
POINT IV.

DEFENDANT'S USE OF APPRAISER CARROLL WAS NOT

BASED UPON HIS SUPERIOR QUALIFICATIONS TO THOSE OF APPRAISER
CURTIS.
In an effort to try to rehabilitate their conduct in
using Carroll in place of Curtis at the last minute in order to
provide an appraisal one-half that which they had used to make
their offer and on which they were supposedly relying in terms of
communications with counsel until the eve of trial, defendant
asserts:
"Defendant's decision not to use Mr. Curtis as a.
witness was based on his lack of qualifications to
testify as an expert witness on property valuations.
Mr. Curtis did not have any appraisal designations and
had never testified in court regarding property
valuations." (Page 11 of defendant's Brief.)
Defendant neglects to additionally mention that the
witness they did use, one Howard R. Carroll, was and is by
profession a banker with appraising as a sideline only, who also
had no "appraisal designations."

They therefore didn't provide a

better witness or a more qualified witness, just a "lower" one.
Specifically, Mr. Carroll was asked at the outset of his

testimony, after talking about the few classes he had taken from
the State Tax Commission and classes offered at BYU, he claimed
the designation of a C.R.E.A."

He was then asked by defense

counsel:
"Q

What is a C.R.E.A?

"A

Certified Real Estate Appraiser.

"Q

When did you receive that?

"A

About a year and a half ago.

"Q

What do you have to do to obtain that certification?

"A
That's a professional organization of real estate
appraisers. It is not an organization to which extensive
educational background is required." (R. 376)
On cross-examination he further acknowledged that the
great majority of his appraisals were in connection with the
making of loans and that, while he had occasionally represented
some landowners in some lawsuits as an expert witness, the great
bulk of his work was on behalf of lending institutions. (R. 413)
So defendant had a choice of two appraisers, one of whom
they relied on to make a would-be offer on the property and the
other, with no greater qualifications, but who had the actual
experience of sitting in the witness chair and, using the very
same market data gathered by the first, came in at one-half the
first's appraisal.
Plaintiffs again contend that defendant has not
justified its choice of witnesses, but simply added more fuel to
the bad-faith claim originally asserted by them.

Moreover, it seems significant that defendant has not
one word in its Brief trying to rehabilitate Mr. Carroll's
testimony and the objectionable character thereof that is pointed
out at length in plaintiffs1 original Brief.
In its Brief, at page 11, defendant asserts, without
reference to the record, that Mr. Curtisfs testimony "as an expert
witness regarding property values" was rejected by the court.
That is not accurate.

Curtis was never tendered by plaintiffs or

by defendant as an expert witness.

Plaintiffs attempted to have

Curtis testify about his involvement in the case relating to
negotiations between plaintiffs and defendant, but that proffered
testimony was rejected by the court on the ground that it dealt
with settlement negotiations.

That ruling was error, and the

testimony should have been admitted for the limited purpose of
showing bad faith on the part of defendant, but Curtis was not
rejected by the court as an expert witness. There has to be a
first time for every expert witness to testify in court, and such
a witness is not barred from testifying just because he had not
testified before.
POINT V.

THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO

ROYALTIES DOES NOT PRECLUDE THEIR RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR THE
TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY.
Next defendant tries to argue that plaintiffs should be
content with only the benefits of the lease and not be entitled to

damages for the ground taken for the well site and road.
Defendant asserts at page 16:
"Plaintiff should not be allowed to receive the
benefits of the lease, i.e., the royaltiy, and then
claim that although the ground is subject to a valid
lease in favor of defendant, plaintiff is not bound by
the terms of the lease as to damages. To allow
plaintiff to recover damages under a theory of eminent
domain would be improper and without precedent."
This argument overlooks the fact that all the people
holding leases in Section 25 are collecting royalties, but only
the plaintiffs1 land got stuck with the burden of a well and a
well site, and whether one calls it eminent domain theory or
Flying Diamond v. Rust theory, these plaintiffs are entitled to
damages, separate and apart from any entitlement to royalties.

It

is equally obvious that such recovery is not a case of "have their
cake and eat it too," nor is it overreaching by the plaintiffs as
asserted by defendant at pages 16 and 17 of its Brief.

It is true

that the lease spells out the amount of royalty, but without the
lease, plaintiffs still own the oil, and defendant has nothing.
POINT VI.

DEFENDANT ERRS IN ITS BRIEF IN SUGGESTING

THAT THE MINERAL LESSEE CAN PLACE ITS OIL DRILLING FACILITIES
ANYWHERE IT DESIRES.
At page 14 of its Brief defendant cites 38 Am Jur 2d,
Gas and Oil, Section 115, and alleges with respect thereto that
Flying Diamond is consistent therewith.

We respectfully submit

that Flying Diamond is not consistent therewith.

The Am Jur

citation seems to indicate that a lessee can place oil drilling

facilities anywhere he wants without regard to the surface owner
even though such a placement would be equally convenient for the
lessee.

We believe that Flying Diamond stands for just the

opposite, that the lessee not only must accommodate the owner
where it is not hurtful to the lessee to do so, but even in cases
where it is hurtful if the balancing of interests so dictates,
POINT VII. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AT THE RATE OF TEN PERCENT PER ANNUM.
Defendant claims at page 29 of its Brief that
prejudgment interest is not proper because " . . . the theories of
recovery and the appraisals [are] so divergent, it is impossible
to calculate with mathematical certainty any damage sustained by
plaintiffs."

(See page 29 of respondent's Brief.)

The number of theories of recovery is irrelevant.

The

only question is, does the correct theory of recovery allow
prejudgment interest?
irrelevant.

Likewise, the divergency of appraisals is

Once the fact finder determines value, prejudgment

interest applies to that amount.

The existence of conflicting

testimony has no bearing on the right to prejudgment interest.
The trial court appeared to base its decision in part at
least upon breach of the lease provision regarding growing crops.
It is elementary that a cause of action for breach of contract
would entitled plaintiffs to prejudgment interest. Furthermore,
the standard adopted by the court of "fair market value" is a
sufficient standard in and of itself to require the awarding of

prejudgment interest, whether under a contract theory or other
theory.

In determining fair market value, the time of the injury

is "certain," namely the time of the taking, and the damages are
measured by an "available standard."

The fact finder is not

allowed to determine fair market value in its unrestricted
judgment as a fact finder can do in the case of "pain and
suffering," for example.

Fair market value is based upon the

evidence and upon the legal definition of fair market value, which
in essence is the price at which a person having something which
he desired to sell, but was not under compulsion to sell, could
and would sell the property to a person who desired to buy, but
was under no compulsion to buy.
Damage to property, whether personal or real, involves a
determination of the fair market value of the property before the
injury and after the injury, and the cases cited in plaintiffs1
original Brief clearly allow interest for damage to property.

See

Fell v. Union Pacific, 32 Ut 101, 88 P 1003 (1907), and Uinta
Pipeline v. White Superior Company, 546 P2d 885 (Utah 1976).
For the reasons stated in plaintiffs1 original Brief at
pages 41 to 44, Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, does not
preclude the ten percent interest rate.

Defendant does not

address those reasons, nor refute the same, and there appears to
be no need for rebuttal, and the interest rate should be
determined to be ten percent per annum.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs respectfully
request that this Court reverse the lower court's determination
that the defendant met the requirements of Flying Diamond in
selecting the location of the well-site and road, that the Court
determine that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the
4.76 acres taken, together with severance damages, and that the
Court determine that the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation
for all of the foregoing damages at the highest and best use of
the property, to-wit, residential purposes, that the Court
determine that the property taken by the defendant has no residual
value to plaintiffs of $375 per acre, or of any other sum, and
that the Court determine that plaintiffs are entitled to
prejudment interest at the rate of 10% per annun, and that the
Court remand this case to the lower court for a determination of
the fair market value for the highest and best use of the
property, to-wit, residential purposes, both as to the 4.76 acres
taken and as it relates to severance damages to the remainder of
plaintiffs' tract.
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